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McNamar: Business Planning as it Should Be: Why Aldman Should be the Stand

BUSINESS PLANNING AS IT SHOULD BE:
WHY ADLMAN SHOULD BE THE STANDARD
WHEN INTERPRETING THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE
Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession
to perform its functions either without wits or on wits
borrowedfrom the adversary.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Jeffrey Smith, Chief Financial Officer of Davidson Enterprises,
recently met with the company's corporate counsel to discuss a corporate
merger. 2 Davidson, a software developer, and Computersoft Company
have been contemplating a merger since the companies co-developed a
revolutionary operating system. Davidson is seeking such a merger to
tap into Computersoft's strong software distribution system. Davidson
proposed a buy-out of Computersoft which, Smith indicated, will result
in a sizeable tax loss. Davidson wishes to recoup this loss. During this
conversation, Smith explained that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
has audited Davidson annually since the software company's founding
in 1970. The corporate attorney knows that the IRS always audits refund
claims beyond a certain dollar amount. This refund will surpass that
threshold. Smith asked Davidson's corporate attorney to determine how
the IRS will likely approach the problem.
Smith requested a
memorandum that details whether Davidson should execute a merger or
form a partnership. He also wanted to know what issues might come up
in court in the event that the company completes the merger. Finally,
Smith wanted to know how the company could fend off any attack by
the IRS. Smith left the corporate attorney's office and the legal
department immediately went to work.
After delivering the memorandum containing everything that Smith
requested, Davidson merged with Computersoft. Soon thereafter, the
IRS filed suit to block the sizeable refund that was a result of the losses
incurred during the deal. During the initial discovery hearing, the IRS
asked for every document that applied to this merger. Davidson's
attorneys turned over every fact-oriented document, but withheld the

I Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,516 (1947).
2 This hypothetical was conceived entirely by the author and utilizes fictitious names.
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memorandum that they created for Smith and Davidson claiming that it
was protected by the work product doctrine. The fact is, because there is
uncertainty surrounding the work product doctrine and because this
memo was not prepared solely for litigation, the attorneys could possibly
be ordered by the court to turn over what will become Davidson's trial
strategy. The court's ruling will depend on where this hypothetical takes
place. If the court is not in one of the federal districts subscribing to the
broader reading of the work product doctrine, the IRS will soon know
how Davidson Enterprises plans on defending itself in this action.3
Attorneys, judges, and other scholars have criticized the scope of the
work product doctrine both before and after the codification of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) 4 in 1970.5 Judges and academics alike
Since the decision handed down in United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir.1998),
five other circuits, aside from the Second Circuit, have determined that the standard for the
work product doctrine protects documents prepared "because of" litigation. Circuit Split
Roundup, 66 U.S.LW. 2597 (1998). The First, Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have clearly come
down with a more narrow holding that the item sought to be protected must have been
prepared "primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation." Id. No dual purpose is allowed.
Id.
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) states that.
3

[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things...

prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or by or for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only
upon showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
The Federal rule of Criminal Procedure similarly states:
[T]his rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the
attorney for the government or any other government agent
investigating or prosecuting the case. Nor does the rule authorize the
discovery or inspection of statements made by government witnesses
or prospective government witnesses ....
FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(2).
Although this rule cites to what is not discoverable by the defendant, Fed. R.Crim. P.
16(b)(2) is a reciprocating rule dealing with what is not discoverable by the government.
This Note will not deal with the criminal rule.
5 Discovery Procedure Symposium, Comments Before the 1946 Conference of Third United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 403 (1946) [hereinafter, Discovery
Symposium]. Throughout the Symposium, various attorneys, and even a Senator, spoke for
and against the proposed discovery rule. Id. The portion of the rule that eventually was
submitted, but not included in the final rule, reads as follows:
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety,
indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparationof trial
unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly
prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing
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have championed arguments for both broad and narrow readings of the
rule even during the rule's formulation. 6 Although numerous judges
and attorneys in the United States have asserted various arguments since
the 1940s, debate on this topic is not just a twentieth century
phenomenon. In fact, similar debates started in the courts of England in
the late 1800s7 and continued in Canadian courts during the 1930s. 8
Thus, confusion abounds throughout various court systems as to the
status of the work product doctrine.
Despite the confusion, this Note demonstrates that the interpretation
of the work product doctrine as laid out in United States v. Adlman 9 is the
proper standard for the Federal Court System because it is the standard
that scholars and lawyers initially introduced in 1947.10 This Note shows
that a protected memorandum can be prepared with the dual purpose of
planning a business decision and planning for future litigation without
offending the premise of the work product doctrine because such a
document can contain a lawyer's mental impressions and strategies;
items that the rule is designed to protect.1 Because Rule 26(b)(3) does
not specifically limit work product protection to documents solely
prepared for litigation, the Adlman standard is the correct interpretation

his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice.
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of
the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories, or... the conclusions of an expert.
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedures, Report of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, reprinted in 5 F.R.D.
436,456-57 (1946) (alteration in original).
As shown by the language in the original proposal, the work product doctrine was never
meant to protect only those materials prepared solely for trial. It encompasses materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Id. Congress finally codified Rule 26(b)(3) in 1970.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(3) (Advisory Committee's note). The committee indicated that it
created the rule to eliminate the "good cause" requirement as explained in Rule 34 and in
Hickman v. Taylor. Id. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a) (West 1992). This statute gives the
United States Supreme Court the power to proscribe the rules of procedure used in the
federal court system. Id.
6
See Discovery Symposium, supra note 5, at 424, 430. This symposium, which first
promulgated the language found in Rule 26(b)(3), was composed of elected representatives,
judges and attorneys. Id. at 403.
7 See infra section Il.A.
8 See infra section II.A.
9 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the proper reading of the work product
rule indicates that protection extends to documents prepared "because of" either expected
or existing litigation even if the documents do not have the exclusive purpose of assisting
in litigation).
10 See infra section m.
" See infra section 1m1.
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of the rule.12 The Adlman standard allows companies to make business
decisions and effectively plan for future litigation simultaneously
13
without offending the purpose of the work product doctrine.
Furthermore, this Note demonstrates why the inflexible, narrow
reading of the work product doctrine is no longer feasible. 14 Section II
explains the origin of the work product doctrine as it evolved in England
and Canada.15 Section II also discusses the beginnings of the doctrine in
16
the United States and how the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor
impacted the creation of Rule 26(b)(3). 17 Further, this discussion explains
ordinary work product and opinion work product and how different
circuit courts deal with the discovery requests of opinion work
product.18 This Section continues by differentiating the work product
doctrine from the attorney-client privilege. 19
Next, Section III introduces Adlman and its broader reading of the
work product doctrine. 20 This Section also introduces the narrower
standard as explained in United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.21 Section III will
also addresses the current status of the work product doctrine among the
U.S. federal circuits. 22 Section III explains the impact that the two
standards can have on business planning.23 Additionally, Section ILI.B
advocates that the federal circuits should adopt the Adlman standard
because it allows a business to plan for the future without offending the
premise of the work product doctrine. 24 Finally, Section IV introduces a
proposed judicial test to determine what materials should be protected
under the work product doctrine. 2s To fully comprehend why this test is

12 See infra section III.B.
13 See infra section III.B.
14 See infra section M.A.
1- See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
16 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). The Hickman Court held that notes taken by an attorney
during witness interviews are protected as the work product of the attorney since he needs.
to "prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference." Id.
17 See infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text. See also supra note 4 for the text of Rule
26(b)(3).
18 See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 147-84 and accompanying text.
21 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). See infra section III.
2 See infra notes 133-84 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 133-84 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
2s See infra section IV.
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feasible and not offensive to Rule 26(b)(3), however, there must be an
understanding of the rule's foundation.
II. HISTORY OF AND RATIONALE BEHIND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE

Congress and the courts have incorporated several changes in the
work product doctrine since the seminal case of Hickman.26 Since the
doctrine's formal introduction into federal procedure in Hickman, and its
codification in Rule 26(b)(3), judges and lawyers have grappled with
how broadly to read the phrase "in anticipation of litigation." 27 In order
to understand the doctrine, an explanation of the doctrine's origin is
warranted. This Section explains how jurisdictions outside the United
States have dealt with work product questions. 28 This Section also
introduces Hickman and explains how this case influenced the way in
which courts and attorneys interpret the work product doctrine. 29
A. The Work Product Doctrine as Applied by Other Court Systems
English courts, as early as 1881 with Wheeler v. LeMarchant,30
recognized that some aspects of an attorney's work needed to be
protected. 31 In Wheeler, the plaintiff sought to discover some letters that

See infra section 11.B.1. for a discussion of Hickman v. Taylor. Although the text of Rule
26(b)(3) has not changed, courts have used various interpretations of the rule when ruling
on discovery questions. See infra section I1. See supra note 4 for the text of the work
product doctrine, Rule 26(b)(3).
2
EDNA SELAN EPsTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 311-12 (3d ed. 1997). Epstein points out that cases have introduced standards
ranging from an attorney having to "envision litigation", Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136, 151 (D. Del. 1977), to an attorney needing to have concrete facts that would
show that the situation would "likely lead to litigation", Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,865 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Such discrepancies in verbiage lead
to confusion in the rule. See infra section IIl.
2
See infra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
- 17 Ch. D. 675 (1881).
31 See id. at 681. In looking at what may be protected under the newly created work
product doctrine, the court noted:
[D]ocuments are protected where they have come into existence after
litigation commenced or in contemplation, and when they have been
made with a view to such litigation, either for the purpose of obtaining
advice as to such litigation, or of obtaining evidence to be used in such
litigation, or of obtaining information which might lead to the
obtaining of such evidence.
26
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were passed between the defendant and his solicitor. 32 LeMarchant, the
defendant, subsequently filed an affidavit seeking to protect the letters
from discovery by Wheeler, the plaintiff.
LeMarchant's solicitor
prepared the letters, which contained notes, opinions, and other
accounts, for the defense of another related action.3m The Wheeler court
determined that, in general, documents containing legal advice that are
created for litigation are protected from discovery. 5 It said that courts
created and cultivated this rule to allow a person to consult an attorney
and safely obtain legal advice without the fear of having to turn the
information over to an adversary.36
Another English court in Lyell v. Kennedy 37 further clarified the
decision in Wheeler. In Lyell, Kennedy had answered some interrogatories
as requested by Lyell.m Lyell felt that the answers were insufficient and
should be expounded upon.39 Kennedy balked at this because he felt
that further answers would reveal protected information. 40 The court
held that Kennedy's answers to the interrogatories were sufficient and
nothing more needed to be revealed. 41 The Lyell court explained that a
party to the case did not have to reveal briefs that were prepared by an
attorney for the purposes of trial because insight into the solicitor's mind
may be gained if such items were revealed.42 The court in Lyell, in
determining whether the work product of the attorney should be

Id. This was an action requesting specific performance of a building contract. Id. at 675.
Defendants were to grant a lease of certain land to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff's
constructing of certain buildings. Id. Defendants also were to advance money to the
plaintiff as the buildings progressed. Id.
3
Id. at 681.
34 Id. at 675-76. The related case dealt with the administration of an estate. Id. at 675. The
plaintiff requested documents from that action dealing with the estate and documents
dealing with this action also. Id.
32

3

Wheeler, 17 Ch. D. at 681.

-1 Id. at 682. Although this seems to indicate that advice falls under the attorney-client
privilege, once the communications become documented and are of the nature of advice,
such documents become covered by the work product doctrine. See infra notes 98-104 and
accompanying text for a discussion on the attorney client priviledge.
- 27 Ch. D. 1 (1884).
38 Id. at 2.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 11-12.
41
42

Id. at 26-27.
Lyell, 27 Ch. D. at 26-27.
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protected, laid the groundwork as to what documents will be protected
43
under the work product doctrine as determined in Hickman.
The English courts, however, were not the only courts to recognize
the importance of protecting certain information an attorney gains
during trail preparations. 44 In 1939, a Canadian court decided McCart v.
McCart.45 In McCart, a husband in a divorce action appealed the
dismissal of a discovery motion.46 The husband sought discovery of a
report that an investigator, employed by the wife, prepared for
litigation.47 The McCart court held that documents containing proof to a
key element of the case were privileged because they were produced for
litigious purposes." These decisions from Wheeler, Lyell, and McCart
established a precedent that the United States courts appear to have
followed.
B. Hickman and Beyond: The Various Interpretations of the Work Product
Doctrine in the United States
1. The Hickman Decision
Despite England's and Canada's early progress in determining what
the work product doctrine protects in their respective legal systems, the
United States did not address the work product doctrine until the late
1940s when the Supreme Court decided Hickman.49 In Hickman, a
tugboat owned by Taylor sank, killing five people including Mr.

43

See id. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Harrison G. Kildare, Discovery

ProcedureSymposium, Comments Before the 1946 Conference of Third United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, reprinted in 5 F.RD. 403, 417 (1946) [hereinafter Kildare, Discovery
Symposium]. Kildare indicated that the same principles laid out in Lyell are found in
Hickman. Id.
See Kildare, Discovery Symposium, supra note 43, at 417.
- 3 D.L.R. 777 (1939).
46

Id.

47 Id. The report that the husband wanted contained the minute details of an adulterous

affair that allegedly took place. Id. at 777-78.
See id. at 778. See also Kildare, Discovery Symposium, supra note 43, at 417.
49 See Discovery Symposium, supra note 5. The Discovery Symposium speakers addressed the
impact that the Hickman case was having on the work of the committee. Id. See also
Kildare, Discovery Symposium, supra note 43, at 417. Even Kildare indicated that the rulemakers in the U.S. should take heed of the decisions in Wheeler, Lyell, and McCart. Id. The
Hickman Court even acknowledged the English Courts' development of the concept of
protecting documents prepared by counsel with an eye towards litigation. Hickman, 329
U.S. at 510 n.9 (1947).
4
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Hickman.s° As a result of the sinking, Hickman's estate sued Taylor to
recover damages under the Jones Act.51 During discovery, attorneys for
Hickman sent Taylor's attorney, Samuel Fortenbaugh, an interrogatory
requesting that any notes from interviews conducted in preparation for
trial be attached to the interrogatories.5 2 Fortenbaugh declined to attach
53
the notes from the interviews because he felt that they were privileged.
Fortenbaugh claimed that since the witnesses were still available and
that the transcripts from a hearing in front of the United States
Steamboat Inspector were available, he did not have to turn over his
interview notes5 4
Although the district court acknowledged that discovery should be
limited, the court did not feel that Hickman's request was abusive when
it ruled that both the written and oral statements obtained by
Fortenbaugh were not protected such that they should be turned over to
Hickman. 55 The Third Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling when it
stated that the rules of procedure contemplate this type of work by an
attorney.56 The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's ruling.57 The

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480-81 (E.D. Pa. 1945)
(providing a detailed factual summary in the district court's background section).
51 Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 480. See also 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (West 1975 & Supp. 1999). The Jones
Act provides a means of recovery for injury to or death of a seaman. Id.
52 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498-99.
The statements that Hickman wanted consisted of
Fortenbaugh's (Taylor's attorney) interviews of the tugboat's surviving members and other
persons believed to have known something about the accident. See Hidoman, 4 F.R.D. at
481. These statements were apparently taken after a hearing by the United States
Steamboat Inspector regarding the sinking of the tugboat. Id.
5 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498-99.
5 Id. The Court determined that Hickman did not show that denial of this information
would unduly prejudice the preparation of his case, nor would denial cause any hardship
or injustice. Id. at 509. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text for a discussion on
substantial need and undue hardship tests.
55 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 505. The district court said that discovery should not be abused to
the point that opposing parties are able to obtain an opponent's theories, impressions, or
opinions on the case. Id. The Supreme Court indicated that the district court incorrectly
based its ruling on Rule 34 which states that the party opposing discovery may be forced to
disclose items upon showing of good cause by the requesting party. Id. at 502,505. See also
Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 482-83. The district court indicated the need to protect the impressions
of an attorney, but it never considered that how an attorney who questions witnesses could
give a possible roadmap as to the questioning of an attorney's possible strategy(s). Id. at
482-83. The district court held Fortenbaugh in contempt for not complying with the
discovery order. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 505.
56 Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945). The Third Circuit introduced the
term "work product" during its opinion. Id. The Court said that protection should attach
to the "results of the lawyer's use of his tongue, his pen, and his head for his client." Id.
50
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Supreme Court indicated that because Hickman could find the desired
information in a variety of ways, the only plausible reason for the
discovery request was to get into the mind of Taylor's attorney. 58 The
various rules employed during the trial by the district court to determine
what material is discoverable, however, prompted the Supreme Court to
note that a specific discovery standard on work product needed to be
59
articulated.
Early in the Hickman trial, the courts realized that no clear guidelines
existed to determine what materials should be protected. 6° As a result of
these uncertainties in this area of discovery, the Third Circuit Rules
61
Committee introduced Rule 30(b), the precursor to Rule 26(b)(3).
Although the Supreme Court did not adopt the specific language of the
work product doctrine into Rule 30(b) at that time, the Supreme Court
introduced, and Congress accepted, similar language into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as Rule 26(b)(3) in 1970.62 The committee that
formulated this rule focused on how broadly to construe the scope of

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 514. The Court said that the discovery rules were not developed to
open the files and mental processes of lawyers to opposing counsel for an adversary to
scrutinize. Id.
58 Id. The Court said that the petitioner could find the witness' testimony that was
requested of Taylor by looking at the testimony taken before the United States Steamboat
Inspectors. Id. at 509. Since the testimony was available from an alternative source that
Hickman knew of, the request could not be a result of hardship, but a desire to get into the
mind of Taylor's attorney. Id.
59 Id. at 510-14. The Court indicated that although several of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure addressed the types of requests of Taylor's attorney, no one rule specifically
dictated a particular result. Id. at 513-14.
60 See Samuel B. Fortenbaugh, Jr., Discovery Procedure Symposium, Comments Before the
1946 Conference of Third United States Circuit Court of Appeals, reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 403,
408-13 (1946). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd, 153 F.2d 212
(3d Cir. 1945) (holding that the interrogatories, which were directed at opposing counsel
regarding interviews that opposing counsel secured, do not preclude the requesting
attorney from bringing suit to obtain the requested information because this is within the
proper scope of discovery).
61 Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedures, Report of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, in 5 F.R.D. 436, 456-57
(1946). At that time, each circuit was able to introduce rules for procedure as allowed by 28
U.S.C. § 723(c). See Discovery Symposium, supra note 5, at 403. See also supra note 5 for the
text that the committee originally introduced.
62 Congress finally codified Rule 26(b)(3) in 1970. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (Advisory
Committee's note). The committee recognized the vexing problems of the discovery rules
such that these amendments were an attempt to find compromise. Id. Although this Note
recognizes that there still are problems with the discovery rules, this Note attempts to only
resolve the work product doctrine problem. See infra section IV. See also supra note 4 for
the text of Rule 26(b)(3).
V
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discovery.63 It recognized the need for adversarial parties to disclose
factual material during discovery. 64
The committee, however, also recognized the importance of
protecting one attorney's work from the other so that one attorney is not
doing the work for both sides.65 Thus, from Hickman to the formulation
of the current discovery rule, the premise behind the work product
doctrine is that an attorney, when preparing for litigation, should not
have to give up those items that would allow an opposing attorney to
piggyback on another attorney's work.66 The Adiman decision is a logical
extension of this thought process. AdIman, however, did not evolve
solely from Hickman.
It also based its reasoning on rationale
promulgated by the Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States.67
2. The Work Product Doctrine Continues to Evolve with the Upjohn
Decision
The work product rule continued evolving and took another big step
with the decision in Upjohn. In this case, the Upjohn Company
("Upjohn") conducted an internal investigation of potentially illegal
payments to several foreign governments. 68 The company discovered
the discrepancies during an audit conducted by its independent

63 Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, Comments Before the
Ninth Annual Postgraduate Conference of the Columbia Law School Alumni Association
(Mar. 23, 1968), in 45 F.R.D. 479, 481-93 (1969). Rosenberg indicated that the committee
kept two policies in mind when formulating the new work product rule. Id. at 492. First, it
realized that the adversarial process must be protected despite the need for the free
exchange of information between opposing counsel. Id. Second, the committee wanted to
make sure that both the plaintiff and the defendant prepared independently for trial. Id. at
493. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (Advisory Committee's note).
64 See Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 493. Rosenberg commented that the court itself has an
interest in both a plaintiff's and defendant's counsel doing thorough preparation "for in an
adversary system, the sparks of contest illumine the pathway to decision." Id.
65 Id. See also Fred A. Freund, Federal Pretrial Discovery: Work Product, Address Before
the Ninth Annual Postgraduate Conference of the Columbia School Alumni Association
(Mar. 23, 1968), in 45 F.R.D. 493 (1969). Although Freund would modify which materials
are discoverable, he still advocates the idea that each attorney should prepare his own
strategies free from discovery by an adversary. Id. at 498.
6
See infra section II.
- 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (holding that the work product doctrine applies to IRS summonses
because the summonses request information that is either protected by the work product
doctrine or the attorney-client privilege).
w Id.at 387-88. Company attorneys prepared letters containing a questionnaire in which
the attorneys wanted to determine the nature and magnitude of payments by company
managers to officials of foreign governments. Id. at 386-87.
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accountants. 69 Upjohn voluntarily submitted preliminary reports of the
investigation, which were based upon employee interviews, to both the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the IRS.7° Subsequently, the
IRS initiated its own investigation to determine whether there were any
improperly accounted for funds.71 While conducting this investigation,
the IRS sought copies of the employee interviews. 72 Upjohn refused to
produce them claiming that the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine protected the documents. 73
The Upjohn Court agreed with the company when it held that a
corporation's attorneys may invoke the work product doctrine to
prevent the disclosure of statements made by employees seeking legal
advice because the questioning could reveal the mental process of the
attorney.74 The Court also recognized the various problems that could
arise if such recordings were not protected.75 One problem that the
Court noted is that much of what attorneys currently record would
probably remain unwritten if the discovery rules were too liberal. 76 The
Court also opined that liberal discovery rules would promote laziness by
opposing counsel because an opponent's thoughts and strategies would
become readily available.77 If allowed, such invasive discovery rules
would demoralize the efficient lawyer and the judicial process would
eventually suffer.78

69
70

Id.
Id.

71 Id.

72 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387-88. The IRS wanted copies of the questionnaires as well as notes

and memorandums from any interviews conducted in relation to this action. Id.

Id. at 388. Upjohn claimed work product protection because the notes and memoranda
sought by the government would reveal its attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the
information gained from the Upjohn employees. Id.at 401.
74 Id. at 399-400.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 398. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
7
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398-401. See also Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine:
Protection, not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 919 (1983). Cohn points out that by forcing the
disclosure of an opponent's completed file, much of an attorney's need for personal
research and investigation would be eliminated. Id.
78 Cohn, supra note 77, at 919. See also ROGER S. HAYDoCK Er AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRETMAL LITIGATION 223-28 (3d ed. 1994). Haydock indicates that by protecting an
attorney's thought process, the work product doctrine protects the effectiveness of a
lawyer. Id. at 226. See also Robb C. Adkins, Note, Protection of Accountant Documents and the
Attorney-Client Privilegeand Work Product Doctrine: Bernardo v. Commissioner, 49 TAX LAW.
949, 957 (1996). Adkins indicates that the work product doctrine rightfully protects an
73
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Although many courts realized that the legal profession and the
judicial process would suffer if the discovery process became too
invasive, courts have not developed a uniform test to limit discovery. 79
Some courts, however recognized that the Hickman Court created a
balancing test to determine when attorneys may discover certain work
product.8 0 The Hickman Court indicated that courts should balance the
systematic interests of an attorney's sphere of privacy against society's
interest in ensuring that all parties obtain knowledge of all of the
relevant facts of a case.81 By balancing these interests, opposing counsel
would be prevented from making unnecessary intrusions into an
attorney's sphere.82 By balancing both interests, courts will best serve
justice. To successfully balance these interests, however, courts must
determine what type of work product the opposing attorney is

requesting.
3. The Fundamental Aspects of the Work Product Doctrine
Through the balancing test introduced in Hickman, courts began to
acknowledge two different types of work product: ordinary work
product and opinion work product.8 Ordinary work product is the
factual information of a case that an attorney or the agent of the attorney
discovers. 84 Hickman, in particular, found that relevant facts obtained

attorney from "merely appropriating the work of opposing counsel" such that each
attorney determines the appropriate strategy to best serve the client. Id. at 954.
See infra section IH. This section points out two standards in use in the federal courts.
See infra section M. See also Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v.
Adlman: Protectionfor Corporate Work Product?, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 627 (1998). The article
points out that courts have applied several tests with regard to what gets work product
protection. Id. Tests include the prospect test, the specific claim or concrete facts test, the
more-than-a-remote-possibility test, and the eye toward litigation test. Id. This Note will
not address these tests.
80 See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir.
1988) (ruling that the identification of exhibits to be used during depositions is considered
ordinary work product; thus, in the interest of an expedited process, the list of exhibits
should be turned over to adversary as the lists do not indicate the mental impressions of
opposing counsel). See also Cohn, supranote 77, at 943.
81 Hickman, 329 U.S. at507-11.
7

a

Id.

83 See id. at 510-12. See also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401 (indicating that the only time that
opinion work product should be discoverable is upon the showing of substantial need of
the sought item and that the equivalent of the item cannot be obtained without undue
hardship because it deals more with the attorneys mental thoughts and analyses); In re
Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that opinion work product should
only be disclosed upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances).
84 HAYDOCK E AL, supra note 78, at 226.
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during the ordinary investigation of a case are considered ordinary work
product and, thus, are more readily discoverable if the opposing counsel
has made a showing of "substantial need" or "undue hardship."ss On
the other hand, the Hickman Court also noted that courts need to give
greater protection to opinion work product.8 6 Opinion work product
generally involves an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, and legal theories.87 The Hickman Court stated that when an
attorney puts this type of work to paper, the requesting party rarely will
be able to show enough of a necessity that could justify the production of
opinion work product.88 Unlike the Hickman Court, other courts have
given absolute protection to opinion work product.8 9 Despite these
different interpretations of opinion work product, the Supreme Court
has yet to mandate one standard of protection. 9°

5 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12. The Court commented that materials that are generally
noted as ordinary work product includes written statements and documents that could be
used as evidence or for impeachment and statements from witnesses that are either no
longer available or reachable with great difficulty. Id. Such items may be obtained upon
the showing of "substantial need" or "undue hardship." Id. Epstein indicates that courts
have found a substantial need exists when witnesses are deceased, have faulty memories,
or cannot be found or subpoenaed. EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 352. See also Jarvis, Inc. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 293 (D. Colo. 1979) (holding that undue hardship
exists when a plaintiff would have to depose 1,500 witnesses to obtain the same material
sought through discovery). This substantial need must be clearly articulated to the court.
EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 352. Epstein also says that an analysis for undue hardship
generally is based upon the cost a party must pay to obtain the information. Id. at 368.
However, cost is not the only basis for undue hardship. Id.; 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 26.70(5)(c)-(d) (3d ed. 1999). For an explanation of the
substantial need/undue hardship test, see infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
86 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512. The court stated that the standards of the profession would
suffer if courts allowed discovery of opinion work product. Id. at 513. It also indicated that
such evidence usually does not qualify as evidence and if you forced an attorney to turn
over such work product for impeachment or corroborative purposes, the attorney would
become more of a witness than a court officer. Id. at 512-13.
87 EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 370.
8 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512. See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981).
The Upjohn Court said that forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda from
witness interviews is particularly disfavored because these notes tend to reveal the
attorney's mental processes. Id.
n See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (stating that
notes from an attorney's conversation with a witness are absolutely protected from
discovery because the notes reflect so much of what an attorney is thinking). See also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that an attorney's notes
from witness meetings are shielded from discovery).
90 In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988). See
also Allen v. McGraw, 106 F.3d 582, 607 (4th Cir. 1997) (indicating that opinion work
product enjoys nearly absolute immunity from discovery); Gundacker v. Unisys Corp., 151
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Even with the confusion about the types of work product and to
what information the work product doctrine applies, courts have
regularly ruled that the work product doctrine is not solely applicable to
court trials. Courts have held that the doctrine protects items prepared
for grand jury investigations,9 1 arbitration hearings, 92 and IRS
investigations.93 In addition, courts have ruled that legal memoranda are
not the only documents that may enjoy protection. Documents that
courts have considered work product include: agendas to meetings, 94
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, 95 drawings
and diagrams,96 and any other items that disclose a lawyer's thoughts
and strategies. 97
At this point, a distinction should be drawn between the work
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client
privilege is a client's privilege to disclose, and keep others from
disclosing, the confidential communications that take place between a
client and a client's attorney. 98 Courts have noted that the work product
doctrine is both distinct from and broader than the attorney-client

F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that opinion work product is only discoverable upon
showing a substantial need for the material and the material cannot be obtained without
undue hardship); Nutramax Lab., Inc. v. Twin Lab, Inc., 183 F.R1D. 458, 462-63 (D. Md.
1998) (showing the various formulations of tests for opinion work product in the Fourth
Circuit alone).
91 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, dated December 19, 1978, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that the work product doctrine may attach to grand jury investigations because
they are similar to pre-trial discovery). The court noted that several other courts, including
one in the Eighth Circuit, had acknowledged that the work product doctrine has been
applied to grand jury proceedings prior to this action. Id. See also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973).
92 Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that because
arbitration is adversarial in nature, documents prepared by or for a party for use in an
arbitration hearing, are protected by the work product doctrine).
93 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397. The Court explained that because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure govern IRS proceedings, documents prepared for such hearings may claim work
product protection. Id.
% In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 966-67 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that meeting agendas
which disclosed material used as part of legal strategy are protected under the work
product doctrine).
95 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
9
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 57 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (allowing
for diagrams to be protected by the work product doctrine if they are prepared by counsel
for trial).
97 See EPSTEIN, supm note 27, at 305.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990). This privilege protects communications
between attorney and client for the purpose of furnishing or obtaining legal advice. Id.
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privilege." This broader protection is needed so that a lawyer may
determine what must be assembled for trial based on these confidential
attorney-client communications. 10° Items covered under the work
product doctrine manifest the judiciary's desire to protect a lawyer's
mental processes, briefs, and other memoranda prepared in anticipation
of litigation. 10 1
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege, however, is to promote
frank, open communications between the attorney and the client.102
Attorney-client privilege also takes into account that "sound legal advice
or advcacy ... depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the
client." 103 Unlike the work product doctrine where either the attorney or
the client may claim protection, the attorney-client privilege requires a
client to assert the privilege. 104
Although the work product doctrine protects a wide variety of
documents in a variety of proceedings, few people may assert the
protection.105 Attorneys may freely assert this protection because their
work usually is the subject of discovery.10 6 Clients 17 and agents acting

United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975), quoted in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET

§ 26.70(8) (3d ed. 1998). The Nobles Court indicated that
work product is different from the attorney-client privilege. Id. See also North Shore Gas
Co. v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 164 F.R.D. 59, 61 (N.D. 111.1995) (ruling that neither
the work product doctrine nor the attorney-client privilege protect documents containing
communications not between the attorneys and the employees). See generally Michael
Keeley, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrines: The Boundaries of Protected
Communications Between Insureds and Insurers,33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1169 (1998).
1WCHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KawPATRICK, EVIENCE § 5.31 (1995). See also In re
Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
101Id. See also HAYDOCK Er AL, supra note 78, at 222.
102HAYDOCK ET AL, supra note 78, at 214.
103
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), quoted in ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET
AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 214 (3d ed. 1994).
104 MOORE ET AL, supra note 85, at § 26.70(8). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 298-99.
105HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 78, at 223. Haydock notes that the key figure, regarding
who may assert the protection, is the lawyer. Id. Although he recognizes the fact that the
presence of a lawyer is not a requirement, he does indicate that it helps. Id. Haydock also
notes that the presence of an attorney does not automatically convert materials into
protected documents. Id. See also MOORE ET AL, supra note 85, at § 26.70(1).
10 MOORE Er AL., supra note 85, at § 26.70(1). The rule protects an attorney's preparation
for trial while at the same time providing for adequate discovery. Id. Both the client and
attorney may claim work product protection. Id.
17 See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 299-300. See also Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp.
136 (D. Del. 1977) (holding that a client may assert a work product claim).
AL, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE
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for an attorney, however, may also assert this protection. 108 In general,
courts determine whether the work product doctrine applies by
determining the content of the document.1 9 If the document or
memoranda contains the attorney's thought processes and is prepared
for use in litigation, courts will likely grant protection.1 10 If the
document or memoranda is prepared for general business use, however,
courts often will not grant protection."'
Once an attorney, agent, or client determines that something may
qualify as work product, that person must assert that protection is
warranted. 1 2 Then, the person asserting the work product rule has the
burden of proving that the rule applies in that case. 113 This is where the
split between the circuit courts creates problems. The attorney, or
whomever is asserting the protection, must determine whether a
particular federal circuit interprets Rule 26(b)(3) in its broad or narrow
form. Then, the attorney must tailor the arguments regarding why a
particular item should be cloaked with the work product doctrine. If the
court accepts these arguments, the burden then shifts to the requesting
party who must show that they have a substantial need for the item(s)
114
and that the item(s) cannot be obtained without undue hardship.

See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (indicating that an agent, such as
an investigator, acting for an attorney may assert the work product privilege in the same
manner that an attorney can).
Epstein notes that as an attorney puts more mental
109 EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 305.
strategies into the document, the greater the possibility that courts will prevent the
attorney's adversary from obtaining the document. Id. See also MOORE ET AL., supra note
85, at § 26.70.
110EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 348-50. This Note argues that the work product doctrine
should be uniformly expanded in all of the Federal Circuits to include documents that have
a dual purpose. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text. This Note advocates that
judges should attach work product protection to a document created because of pending or
reasonably expected litigation; and, but for the pending or reasonably expected litigation,
the document would not have been created in that, or a substantially similar form.
M EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 348-50. Epstein notes that when determining if the document
is prepared for business or non-business purposes, some courts look to see if the document
would have been the same had it been prepared by an attorney. Id. at 350. See also APL
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 16 (D. Md. 1980).
108

112 EPSTEIN,

supra note 27, at 300-01.

113See id.
114Id. See

also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947);

HAYDOCK ET AL, supra note 78, at 227.
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The Supreme Court in Hickman explained the "substantial
need/undue hardship" test.115 The Hickman Court indicated that items
protected by the work product doctrine may be obtained if an attorney
articulates the specific substantial need that they have to discover the
requested document and that the same information cannot be obtained
without undue hardship.1 16 The Hickman Court, in particular, stated that
a substantial need is often found when requested documents contain
those materials that are essential to the preparation of an attorney's
case. 117 Courts have denied production of items under the substantial
need prong when the requesting party has only made a claim of general
need, 118 has requested documents to make sure that the attorney has
"overlooked nothing,"" 9 or has requested documents so the requesting
party may look for the "smoking gun." 120 Courts, however, have found
that the substantial need test is satisfied when an adverse party obtains
information that is essential to the preparation of a case from those who

I's Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. The Court identified one instance that may strip an item of its
work product privilege. Id. It said that when relevant and non-privileged facts are buried
in an attorney's file and those facts are of great importance to the preparation of the
adversary's case, discovery may be necessary. Id. The Court, however, still recognized that
"discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries." Id. at
507. The Court went on to say that not even the most liberal of discovery policies can
rationalize unwarranted inquiries into the mind of an attorney. Id. at 510. See also EPSTEIN,
supra note 27, at 289-91.
116Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509-11. See also MOORE ET AL., supra note 85, at § 26.70(5)(b). Moore
indicates that even if a requesting attorney meets the substantial need/undue hardship
test, the court still must protect against the disclosure of mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories. Id.
117Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. Substantial need may be found when there are statements
which give clues to the existence of relevant facts. Id. Substantial need may also be found
when there is a request for statements which are useful to impeach a witness or to
corroborate a statement. Id. In addition, although production may be allowed in these
instances, courts still should adhere to the general policy against invading the privacy of an
attorney's course of preparation. Id. at 511-12.
11s United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640, 644 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (indicating that
the attorneys wanted to subvert the work product doctrine not for a specific need, but for a
desire to learn what kind of case that the government had). The Hickman Court even
indirectly indicated that a specific need must be shown when it said that discovery may be
allowed when relevant facts essential to the presentation of a case are needed. Hickman,
329 U.S. at 511.
119Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d
Cir. 1979) (indicating that the work product doctrine will probably never be overcome if an
opposing attorney is just looking for material to impeach a witness or to corroborate
testimony).
12oRodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 22 Fed. K Serv. 2d 324, 326 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(holding that mere hope by the plaintiff to find a "smoking gun" does not require the
production of work product material).
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are no longer available due to death, 121 have a faulty memory, 122 or are
no longer within the court's subpoena powers. 123 Courts have also held
that requesting parties have satisfied the substantial need prong when
the witness who provided the needed information is now unavailable
due to the witness's hostility toward the requesting party.124
Even if a court determines that a substantial need for the information
exists, the requesting party still must show that the equivalent
information cannot be obtained without undue hardship. 25 When
making this determination, courts generally look at the cost to obtain
similar information. 126 Courts, however, have held that memory lapses
by witnesses can be considered an undue hardship. 127 In general, when
courts do look beyond the cost of obtaining equivalent information, they

121Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 975, 976 (E.D. La. 1974) (holding that
substantial need exists when the injured party is not alive to give his own account). The
Hamilton court also noted that in this case, the requesting attorney was only looking for
facts and not on a "fishing expedition." Id. See also EPSTEIN, supranote 27, at 355-58.
122State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Perrigan, 102 F.RD. 235, 238 (W.D. Va. 1984) (holding that
a plaintiff suffering from amnesia has a substantial need). The Perrigancourt also noted
that the needed statements were taken prior to the time that the insurance company had
retained an attorney for this action. ld. See also McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 474 (4th
Cir. 1972) (holding that substantial need is demonstrated when a witness with valuable
information can no longer testify due to amnesia); EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 356. Epstein
notes that the faulty memory idea can also apply to forgetful children. Id.
123Hamilton, 395 F. Supp. at 976. This court ordered attorneys to turn over a statement of a
witness that was present at the accident site because that witness was out of the country
during the discovery process. Id.
124 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Dec. 19, 1978, 81 F.RD. 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(stating that a witness is hostile when the witness refuses to testify without a grant of
immunity such that disclosure may be granted). See also Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 518
(8th Cir. 1958) (recognizing that good cause exists such that disclosure should be granted
when a witness refuses to testify).

1258 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025 (2d ed.

1994). The authors note that generally, if substantially similar information may be obtained
by depositions, then the requesting party's discovery request will be denied. Id. at § 2025
n.17. But if substantially similar information cannot be obtained via depositions, courtordered disclosure of the documents is considered justified. Id. at § 2025 n.26. See also In re
International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982). The cost of
obtaining equivalent information is the usual, but not the only, benchmark when
determining whether the requesting party would suffer undue hardship. EPSTEIN, supra
note 27, at 368.
126 EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 368. See also Allen v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 32 F.R.D.
616, 618 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (holding that witness statements are to be produced since the
witness can only be reached with great difficulty and unnecessary expense).
127 Xerox v. I.B.M. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that an attorney must
turn over interview notes of a witness to the requesting party if there was poor recollection
by the witness at a subsequent deposition).
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determine undue hardship based upon the same criteria that are used to
128
determine substantial need.
Although the guidelines behind the work product doctrine might be
clear as to what material might be protected, who may claim the
protection, and what it takes to overcome the protection, courts employ
numerous tests to determine when the doctrine applies.129 Currently,
two main standards are used: 130 the "because of" litigation standard
from Adlman, 131 and the "in anticipation of litigation" used in Gulf Oil.132
The courts concurrent employment of these two distinct standards have
created the current circuit split. The remainder of this Note will explain
these two standards and then explain why the broader interpretation of
the work product doctrine best promotes justice without offending the
premise of the rule.
III. THE STANDARDS OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND WHY THE
ADLMAN STANDARD SHOULD BE MANDATED IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURTS

Although courts agree about the generalities behind the work
product doctrine, they disagree over how broadly to read Rule
26(b)(3). 33 Currently, the federal courts of appeal are evenly divided on
how broadly to read the work product doctrine.1 34 Six circuits follow the

128

See supra notes 117-24, and accompanying text. See also WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 125, at

§ 2025; EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 352-63.
129 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 53 (1983 & Supp. 1997). This article introduces
a variety of formulas that determine the nexus between the creation of material that gets
work product protection and the process of litigation. Id. The various standards include
"substantial probability that litigation will occur and that commencement of such litigation
is imminent," or that litigation must be "real and imminent," or the prospect of litigation
must be "identifiable," or that litigation should "reasonably have been anticipated." Id. See
also supra note 79. For a discussion on who may assert work product protection, see supra
notes 105-08 and accompanying text. For a discussion on what types of materials the work
product doctrine protects, see supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
130Although other standards are circulated amongst the Federal Circuit Courts, this Note
will only focus on the "because of" standard and the "in anticipation of litigation" standard
because the majority of the circuits rely on these two tests. See supra note 79. This Note
indicates some of the tests currently used in the federal courts. Id.
131 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that documents created
"because of" litigation enjoy protection under the work product doctrine).
12 Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296 (indicating that only documents prepared "in anticipation of
litigation" enjoy protection under the work product doctrine).
133 See supra note 3.
134 Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [1999], Art. 5

220 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
narrow rule promulgated by the Fifth Circuit as discussed in Gulf Oil' 3 5
The six remaining circuits interpret the work product doctrine in the
same manner that the Second Circuit does in Adlman.136 The remainder
of this Note explains these two standards of the work product doctrine,
advocates the adoption of the Adlman standard, and finally, introduces
model judicial reasoning, based upon the Adlman decision, that the
37
federal courts should use to promote continuity among the circuits.
First, this Note addresses the Gulf Oil standard.
A. The Gulf Oil Standard
In Gulf Oil, the Company attempted to prevent the U.S. Department
of Energy ("DOE") from discovering certain documents. 138 These
documents contained legal opinions generated by Gulf Oil's legal
counsel for use by the company's accounting firm in an internal audit of
the company. 139 The DOE requested these documents for use in its
pricing suit against Gulf Oil.140 The documents contained the attorneys'
opinions concerning the financial implications of another lawsuit. 141 The
court held that the work product doctrine did not protect these
documents 42 The court relied on a Fifth Circuit case, United States v.

135Circuits that read the work product doctrine narrowly include the First, Fifth, Sixth,

Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh. CircuitSplit Roundup, 66 U.S.L.W. 2597 (1998). See also Gulf Oil,
760 F.2d at 296. This court held that documents should be protected only when primarily or
exclusively created for litigation (emphasis added). Id. Since these documents contained
legal opinions about the financial implications of pending litigation, they were prepared for
an accounting firm and thus not created in anticipation or principally for litigation. Id.
m Other circuits, besides the Second, following the broader reading of the work product
doctrine include the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and D.C. circuits. Circuit Split Roundup,
66 U.S.L.W. 2597 (1998). See also Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (holding that documents
containing legal opinions with regard to a potential business merger are protected under
the work product doctrine as they were prepared because of existing or expected
litigation). This Note does not take into consideration the Federal Circuit's stance.
137See infra sections II and IV.
13 United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292,294 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
13 Id. Along with the documents that dealt with the internal audit, the DOE requested
some documents that pertained to a failed merger between Gulf Oil and Cities Service Co.
Id. Cities prepared various documents for a declaratory judgment action against the DOE.
Id. The documents contained Cities' attorneys' mental impressions and analyses of the
declaratory judgment suit. Id.
140Id. at 294-97. The DOE wanted the documents pertaining to both the internal audit of
Gulf Oil and the declaratory judgment action involving Cities Service. Id. at 294.
141 Id.
14 Id. at 297. The court said that since the documents were created primarily to satisfy the
requirements of the federal securities law the documents were not protected by the work
product doctrine. Id.
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Davis,143 which held that courts must determine whether the "primary
motivating purpose" behind the creation of the documents was to assist
in pending or impending litigation. 144 The Gulf Oil court considered the
dual purpose of the documents and determined that the company did
not prepare the documents "in anticipation of litigation." 145
This decision indicates that documents created with the dual
purpose of helping business planning and assisting litigation are not
entitled to work product protection. 146 This decision eliminates the
protection a business should have when planning for its future, or its
survival. Under this narrow reading of the work product doctrine,
businesses cannot make sound decisions, based upon legal advice,
without the business potentially having to expose the legal advice to an
adversary. On the other hand, if the business does not record its thought
processes in order to prevent future discovery, the business exposes itself
to error due to the lack of documentation. Although this narrow
interpretation may limit squabbles during the discovery process, it
promotes either piggybacking or less thorough trial preparation.
Therefore, Adlman is a better standard.
B. The Adiman Standard
In Adlman, Sequa Corporation ("Sequa") contemplated a merger of
two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries. 147 Knowing that the merger
would trigger a large tax loss and, subsequently, a large tax refund,
Adlman ordered Arthur Andersen & Co. ("Andersen") to perform an

636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). The court stated that papers created in the course of
preparing a person's tax returns are not documents prepared in anticipation of litigation
just because there always exists the possibility of the IRS challenging a return. Id. The
court said to look at the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document.
Id. If the primary purpose was to aid in possible litigation, then the work product
iM

protection may attach. Id.
144 Id. See also United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.

1985).
145 Gulf Oil, 760

F.2d at 297.
See also Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 699 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The Griffith court held
that even though the memorandum was prepared by an IRS agent in preparation for a
possible defense, it was also prepared for an internal report and thus does not qualify
under the work product doctrine since it would have been prepared if litigation would
have been pending or not. Id. The Griffith decision expressly denies protection for
documents created for two purposes even if one of these purposes was litigation. Id.
147 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998). Adlman was an attorney
and Vice President for Taxes at Sequa. Id.
146 Id.
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evaluation of Sequa's planned merger. 148 Andersen's resulting legal
analysis contained the likely IRS challenges to the merger and Sequa's
tax claim. 49 More specifically, the memorandum contained the
applicable statutes, past IRS rulings on these provisions, and possible
legal strategies and theories that Sequa could use should litigation
ensue.150 The memo also contained a recommendation as to how to
structure the merger.' 5' Additionally, the memo contained Andersen's
predictions on the outcome of the anticipated litigation. 5 2 Clearly,
Andersen not only prepared this memo for litigation, but it also
prepared the memo to allow Sequa to make an important business
decision.1sm
Sequa completed the merger of the two subsidiaries based upon the
recommendation of Andersen.'5 4 Shortly thereafter, the IRS began an
audit of the restructuring and the requested refund.ss When Sequa
refused to honor a request for the production of the memorandum
prepared by Andersen, the IRS issued a summons for that particular
document. 5 6 AdIman refused to comply with the request stating that
the work product doctrine protected the memorandum. 5 7 The district
court held that the work product doctrine did not protect the
memorandum.'- 8 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
holding explaining that Rule 26(b)(3) 5 9 may protect the memo, as the
16°
memo may have been prepared "because of the prospect of litigation."

48

1

Id. Both Sequa and Adiman expected the IRS to challenge this refund request in court.

Id.

149 Id.

150Id.
151

Id.

152Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.
15 Id.
Sequa's memorandum contemplated the tax issues that would arise in litigation
when the tax refund was filed. Id. Sequa was sure that the decision would result in
litigation. Id. The company would easily be able to rationalize that this memo would be
made because of litigation because had the company not gone forward with the merger,
this tax loss would never have been claimed, and the yearly IRS audit of Sequa probably
would not result in litigation.'

154

Id.

155Id. at 1195-96.

Id. at 11%.
13Adiman, 134 F.3d at 1196.
158United States v. Adlman, 1996 WL 84502, at *1(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996). The district
court held that the memo in question was not prepared "principally or exclusively" in
anticipation of litigation because of the business planning aspects of the memo. Id. Thus,
the memo could not be protected by the work product doctrine. Id.
159See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 26(b)(3).
160 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.2d 1194,1204 (2d Cir. 1998).
156
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The Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court with the
instruction to apply the broader interpretation of the work product
doctrine.161
In analyzing the work product doctrine, the Second Circuit noted
numerous reasons as to why the rule should be given a broad reading. 62
Probably its most compelling argument comes from the fact that the text
of the rule states that work product protection attaches to documents
prepared "in anticipation of litigation." 13 The court indicated that, had
the rule drafters intended to limit the rule's coverage just to items
prepared strictly for litigation, the language of the text would have read
to cover only those documents "prepared ...for trial." 164 The court also
reasoned that the drafters' use of the word "litigation" instead of "trial"
confirms the idea that courts should read the rule broadly.'" The Second
Circuit concluded that there is no language in Rule 26(b)(3) that would
prevent work product doctrine protection for a document created for
both business planning purposes and planning for reasonably
anticipated litigation. 1" The court's conclusion is amply supported by
the legislative history behind the drafting of Rule 26(b)(3). 67 Therefore,
the drafters of the work product doctrine intended for courts to broadly
interpret the doctrine, thus protecting more documents from
discovery.16
Although the AdIman court recognized some problems with the
circuit split, concerning how broadly to read the work product doctrine,
the court ignored three substantial problems. One of the most obvious
problems lies in the possibility of "forum shopping."'"9 Because
corporations may fall under the jurisdiction of several different federal

Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1198-1203.
163 Id. at 1198 (quoting from Rule 26(b)(3)). See supra note 4 for the full text of the rule.
6 Id. See also notes 60-67 and accompanying text. Also, had the drafters of Rule 26(b)(3)
meant to limit the scope of the work product doctrine to only those materials prepared for
trial, the word "solely" would have been inserted into the rule.
165 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198.
166 Id. at 1198-99.
167 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
168 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198-99. See also supra section H. Also, had the drafters of Rule
26(b)(3) meant to keep out documents with a dual purpose, the rule would have stated that
the work product doctrine protects those documents solely prepared in anticipation of
litigation.
169 Forum shopping occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular
court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.
161
162

BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
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circuits, a savvy attorney will investigate the various discovery
standards among the available jurisdictions. 17° The requesting attorney
will likely opt for the circuit adhering to the narrower reading of the
work product doctrine so as to obtain more documents during discovery.
This possibility of forum shopping hinders proper planning by the
corporation's attorneys, as they may not know which standard applies.
To relate this back to AdIman and to the hypothetical company, had the
IRS filed the suit in any federal circuit using the narrow interpretation of
the work product doctrine, the IRS would have obtained the
171
memorandum and both companies would be left virtually defenseless.
Another problem stemming from the split among the federal circuits
relates to an attorney's preparation for trial. The AdIman court
recognized the fact that much of what attorneys write down in
preparation for a business decision that could result in litigation may go
unwritten under the narrower reading because attorneys may have to
give the adversary the legal theories and strategies of a case. 172 Such an
interpretation decimates the primary purpose of the work product
doctrine, which is to provide attorneys with the freedom to "consider
and write their strategy and impressions." 173 Effective business planning
could suffer. Without this protection allowed under Adlman, a risk

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (indicating that as long as
a company has some minimum contact with a state that does not violate the notions of fair
play and substantial justice, the federal courts of that state can exercise personal
jurisdiction over the company). The "Shoe test" would allow a plaintiff to bring a business
into a federal district court that has both personal jurisdiction over the company and a
liberal discovery rule. For example, if the second circuit and the fifth circuit could both
have jurisdiction over a business, a smart plaintiff would bring suit in the fifth circuit in
order to employ the narrower interpretation of the work product doctrine. This forum
shopping could leave a company significantly disadvantaged if it involved the type of
planning like that of Davidson Enterprises, the hypothetical company in the introduction.
171 This is limited, of course, to those jurisdictions where the corporation or business is
deemed to be under the subpoena powers of a particular district court.
172Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), quoted in United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d
1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998). "Neither the interests of clients nor the cause of justice would be
served ...if work product were freely discoverable." Id.
"3 Robb C. Adkins, Note, Protectionof Accountant Documents and the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work Product Doctrine: Bernardo v. Commissioner, 49 TAX LAW. 949, 957 (1996). See
also Bernardo v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 677 (1995) (holding that the documents in question
were created with a reasonable anticipation of litigation because a piece of art that was
appraised by an advisory panel was deemed to be worth a substantially smaller amount
than was claimed under a charitable deduction).
170See
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adverse attorney may not be as thorough in documenting research or
strategy in light of the uncertainty over what is discoverable. 174
Arguably the biggest problem for businesses in the federal circuits
using the narrower reading of the doctrine lies in the fact that some
business planning and decisions might not be premised on thorough
research. If a business knows that internal memoranda may be available
to the business' adversaries through discovery, the business may not
create the documents, which could result in poor decision making. The
AdIman court considered three different examples of when the narrower
reading could hurt a business planning for its future. l5 The first
example introduces facts similar to the Adiman case:
A company contemplating a transaction recognizes that
the transaction will result in litigation; whether to
undertake the transaction and, if so, how to proceed
with the transaction, may well be influenced by the
company's evaluation of the likelihood of success in
litigation. Thus, a memorandum may be prepared in
expectation of litigation with the primary purpose of
helping the company decide whether to undertake the
contemplated transaction.176
The AdIman court stated that the work product doctrine should
protect this memorandum.177 Under the Fifth Circuit's inflexible rule,
however, the memorandum probably would be discoverable despite the
memorandum being an attorney's opinion work product. This is
because the memorandum has the dual purpose of preparation for
litigation and for business planning that the Fifth Circuit does not
allow. 17s A second example that the court set forth is the following:
A company is engaged in, or contemplates, some kind of
partnership, merger, joint undertaking, or business
association with another company; the other company
reasonably requests that the company furnish a candid
assessment by the company's attorneys of its likelihood
of success in existing litigation.
For instance, the

174 Bernardo, 104 T.C. at 677.
175United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194,1199-1200 (2d Cir. 1998).

176Id. at 1199.
177

Id.

17 See United States v.

Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292,297 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
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company's bank may request such a report from the
company's attorneys concerning its likelihood of success
in an important litigation to inform its lending policy
toward the company. 179
Again, the AdIman court would protect this type of document, while
the narrow reading of the work product doctrine would not. 180 The
AdIman standard protects these types of documents because the
documents disclose an attorney's most intimate thoughts and
strategies. 181 Finally, the third example introduced in Adlman indicates
that the following circumstances would enjoy protection from discovery
under the work product doctrine:
A business entity prepares financial statements to assist
its executives, stockholders, prospective investors,
business partners, and others in evaluating future
courses of action. Financial statements include reserves
for projected litigation. The company's independent
auditor requests a memorandum prepared by the
company's attorneys estimating the likelihood of success
in litigation and an accompanying analysis of the
company's legal strategies and options to assist it in
estimating what should be reserved for litigation
losses.182

Like the previous two examples, these writings would enjoy
protection under the AdIman standard, but do not enjoy protection under
the Gulf Oil standard. These examples share the Adlman court's idea that
a document can have a dual purpose and yet still be protected from
discovery by the work product doctrine if attorneys are reasonably
expecting litigation at the time of the document's creation. 183 The court
"9 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199-1200.
180Id.at 1200.
Is' Id. at 1199. The judicial reasoning advocated in this Note would not grant work product
protection to this document. See infra section IV. This is too broad of a reading of the rule
because the documents that are mentioned in the second hypothetical do not have the dual
purpose of assisting in litigation and assisting in making a business decision. In the
hypothetical, the documents are solely used for a business decision. Although such
documents may include our attorney's mental impressions, such a reading seems to stretch
the work product doctrine past its intended boundaries.
18 Adlnan, 134 F.3d at 1200.
183 Id. at 1202. The Adiman court indicated that the document does not lose its protection
under the work product doctrine just because it was created to assist in decision making by
a company. Id. The court said, however, that a document would lose its protection if it
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still acknowledges the fact that a document should not receive protection
if it was produced in the normal activities of the business, or if the
document would have been created in the same form regardless of the
pending action. 184 Instead, the focus should be on whether an attorney
created the document because of anticipated litigation.
Certainly, the planning implications of a business can change
depending on which federal circuit court may have jurisdiction over the
company. By allowing companies like Sequa and the hypothetical
Davidson Enterprises to protect documents with a dual purpose,
however, courts would allow businesses to plan for their futures without
offending the premise behind the work product doctrine. Forwardthinking companies should not be punished via intrusive discovery.
Unfortunately, some federal circuits do not subscribe to this reasoning.
What is considered to be protected in Adiman, because the business is in
the Second Circuit, might be discovered in the Fifth Circuit because the
Fifth Circuit uses the more restrictive "in anticipation of litigation"
standard. 185 This discrepancy disadvantages those companies present in
the jurisdictions reading the work product doctrine narrowly. It also
greatly disadvantages companies that are "present"* in multiple
jurisdictions. These various interpretations of the rule, as evidenced by
the split among the federal circuits, illustrate why the following
proposed judicial reasoning is necessary for proper business planning
and for the work product doctrine in general.
IV. JUDICIAL TEST FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WORK PRODUCT

DOCTRINE
Documents that are prepared solely for litigation purposes currently
are eligible for protection under the work product doctrine. 186
Documents containing the thoughts or opinions of the attorney are

was prepared in the ordinary course of business or it would have been created in a similar
form regardless of the litigation. Id. See also WRIGHT Er AL, supranote 125.
184AdIman, 134 F.3d at 1202 (citing United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir.
1982)).
185See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 297 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). The
court ruled that the documents containing legal opinions about the financial implications of
pending litigation were prepared for an accounting firm and thus not created in
anticipation of, or principally for, litigation. Id.
186 Id. at 296. See also FED.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), supra note 4; Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198.
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protected to an even greater extent. 187 But, there is not a clear standard
that applies to documents that are prepared to make a business decision
that may have litigious consequences.1s 8 Such a document will typically
contain opinions of counsel concerning what issues may come up in
litigation, how to defend the company against the claims, and potential
affirmative defenses that may be raised once the lawsuit commences.1s 9
Although some federal circuits do not apply the work product doctrine
to documents that were created with a dual purpose, the doctrine is
capable of protecting documents or internal memoranda created with a
dual purpose when litigation may reasonably result from the business
decision.
To grant work product protection for dual purpose works, courts
should conduct a two-step analysis. Courts must first determine
whether an attorney created the work product for pending litigation or
litigation that was reasonably expected. Such a determination revolves
around whether litigation has resulted from substantially similar
business decisions. Documented examples of litigation should be
presented. By limiting eligibility to this type of work product, Rule
26(b)(3) is not offended.
Next, if a court determines that litigation was reasonably expected as
a result of the business decision, it must then determine the reason
behind the creation of the document. Documents created out of normal
business practices are not protected by the work product doctrine
because they are not created for pending or future litigation. For
example, if a memorandum is a regular report of pending litigation that
updates employees as to how litigation is progressing, it is not a
document created for litigation; but instead, a document that is created
in the normal business practice. Therefore, a court must determine if the
document would have been created in its same, or substantially similar
form, in the absence of litigation. If the court finds that the documents
would not have been created in its current or similar form but for
potential litigation, then the work product doctrine may apply to the
document. If a document raises defenses or plausible issues that the

18?Courts give opinion work product greater protection so that opposing attorneys cannot

easily get into the mind of their adversary. Courts do not want a lawyer borrowing the
wits of an adversary. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
18 CircuitSplit Roundup, 66 U.S.L.W. 2597 (1998). About half of the federal circuits apply
the broader reading of the work product doctrine as interpreted by AdIman. Id. This broad
reading allows a business some leeway when planning its future.
189United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194,1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
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court may confront as a result of a specific business instance, the work
product doctrine does not automatically attach. If no reasonable
expectation of litigation exists, granting work product protection in such
an instance would offend the premise of Rule 26(b)(3). In addition, a
document does not automatically gain protection just because an
attorney, or agent of an attorney, created it. Finally, the document must
be created to assist in future or pending litigation.
Thus, for the work product doctrine to protect a document, the
following test should be met: 1) the work product must be created
because of pending or reasonably expected litigation; and, 2) but for the
pending or reasonably expected litigation, the work product would not
have been created in that, or a substantially similar, form. If a document
meets this standard, the work product doctrine may attach. If it does
attach, opposing counsel could only obtain the document upon the
showing of substantial need and undue hardship.
Applying this rationale to the hypothetical Davidson Enterprises, its
memo would receive protection under the work product doctrine. The
corporate legal department reasonably expected to have its substantial
tax refund challenged for two reasons. First, the IRS audited the
company annually. Second, the IRS always challenges refunds of the
size that Davidson plans to claim.
Since litigation is reasonably
expected, the next determination is whether the legal department, but for
the pending or reasonably expected litigation, would have created the
memorandum in the same or a substantially similar form. Davidson's
attorneys will argue, successfully, that the department created the memo
solely for the predicted IRS challenge. They would argue that since the
memo included the potential issues of the refund and merger and the
likely arguments that the IRS would make, the memo was created
because of the anticipated litigation. Because Davidson's memo meets
both prongs of the model judicial test as laid out by this Note, the memo
deserves protection under the work product doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION

A broad reading of the work product doctrine would allow
businesses such as Davidson Enterprises to plan for its future without
exposing itself to what could be severely damaging discovery. A
business should be able to thoroughly plan for its future without fear of
having to turn over important materials which helped the company
make a decision if the company reasonably expected the decision to
result in litigation. By granting work product protection to a company's
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dual purpose memorandum that attorneys prepared after litigation was
reasonably anticipated, the company can protect important internal
memoranda from being discovered by opposing counsel while not
offending the premise of the work product doctrine.
Eric C. McNamar
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